This is the first of a 2-part series on the sad state of the Blackhawks. Today, we look at how the Hawks got to this point. Next, where they might go from here.
As I remarked to the other Rink writers this morning: “man, have the wheels come off this team fast.”
This perspective, of course, is exaggerated by a 3-game losing streak. But, let’s face it, the Blackhawks, as a franchise, appear to be in freefall.
On the ice, a team full of players with multiple Cup rings can’t create a goal on the power play. The starting goalie is out, possibly for the entire season, with a mystery ailment that even the team itself has characterized two different ways. The playoffs are a fast-fading pipe dream.
Why?
Because the big money players the team was counting on to be delivering at this point of their careers—with the exception of Patrick Kane—have essentially fallen off a cliff (Brent Seabrook, Jonathan Toews) or are injured with likely or possibly career ending conditions (Corey Crawford, Marian Hossa).
But, from here, the story gets worse.
The team is now hamstrung by these players’ contracts. Between them, the commitments to Toews, Artem Anisimov, Crawford, Seabrook and Hossa count a whopping $31 million yearly against the salary cap.
Add in Duncan Keith, whose game also appears to have fallen off somewhat, and that total becomes slightly over $36 million, or half the Hawks’ cap space—devoted to just 6 underachieving or absent players.
Making matters even worse, all these contracts extend for anywhere from 3 to 7 more years. All have iron clad no movement clauses attached to them, with the exception of Crawford’s, which has a modified no-trade clause attached to it. Meaning: the Hawks can ask Crawford for a list of 8 teams to which he would accept a trade to. And the last two years of Seabrook’s mammoth deal, beginning 3+ seasons from now, have modified no-trade clauses attached to them.
So who’s responsible for this mess?
If you think the simple answer is Stan Bowman, you may be right. Or more likely, partially right.
The Blackhawks, especially since Bowman was tabbed to replace Dale Tallon in 2009, have run a very ‘corporate’ hockey operation. With multiple functionaries milling about, including the GM’s father, legendary coach Scotty Bowman, Team President John McDonough has not hidden the fact that he wants to understand all major hockey decisions—before they’re made.
Regardless, the Hawks, and owner Rocky Wirtz, should know who signed off on these deals, much less who thought they were a great idea.
And yes, it still gets worse.
Toews, Crawford, Seabrook and Anisimov’s mega deals were all signed several months before the expiration of the deals they were on a the time of their signing.
Anisimov signed his deal on July 1, 2015, a full year before his eventual free agency date of 7/1/16—before he ever played a game in the Indianhead, and just a few days after he was acquired in trade from the Blue Jackets.
The dates are also important because they perhaps provide some insight into the mentality of the Hawks at the time.
The contracts of Crawford, Kane, Toews, Seabrook and Anisimov were all handed out between September of 2013 and September of 2015, the time period when the Hawks won two Cups and went to a conference final in a “down” in between year.
So it’s fair to say, likely, that the Hawks not only anticipated a rising salary cap that never materialized due to a variety of larger geo-economic factors, but also, they were confident—perhaps overconfident—that the players would continue at their current levels of production for several years.
The most glaring example, Seabrook was a few months past his 30th birthday when his 8 year deal was signed, that would not go into effect until he was 31.
Some have argued that these deals were “rewards” for services rendered: 3 Cups.
If so, then those responsible for that rationale should have been fired a long time ago. In the age of salary caps—with the reality of aging and injury—that’s simply not how you run a successful pro sports franchise.
Further, the Hawk braintrust made a choice to solidify these deals several months or up to a year before the conclusion of the players’ current contracts. Likely, this was meant to not draw the process out or create ill will. Yet, it also seems to add to the evidence that not a lot of thought and painstaking consideration was put into them either.
So I ascribe to the belief that the Hawks felt confident that, with a rising salary cap, and what they assessed to be the future production of these players, these deals—the salaries, the terms, and the no movement clauses —made sense going forward and over the long term.
With all except Kane, they were flat wrong.
Dedicating one half of your salary cap to injured or underachieving players—with little room for modification or correction—means you have to fill in the remaining 17 spots on your roster as best you can, and on a tight budget.
This is how you end up with an aging Brian Campbell one year—and a thoroughly finished Patrick Sharp the next.
Jordin Tootoo, the Bionic Michal Rozsival, and Lance Bouma.
And a yearly, heavily-hyped youth movement that doesn’t seem to be that productive nor possibly the best way to develop young players. And if you hear the words “Dylan Sikura” coming out of Bowman’s mouth like a repetitive prayer in the next few months, you know why.
This is how you get 22-19-6 after 47 games (which is actually sub .500) and 7th place in the Central Division, 7 points out of a wild card playoff spot.
What about Q?
By now, you may be assuming I am putting all of the blame for this debacle at the feet of Bowman. I’m not.
But, there’s also a school of thought that the Hawks overachieved with a roster built for regular season success—and not for the bump and grind, war of attrition style of the playoffs—in 2015-16 and 2016-2017. That Joel Quenneville over-achieved with what he was given, especially the latter season, last year.
And this year, there just simply isn’t enough there to even create a facade of potency.
That’s one argument anyway.
Here at The-Rink.com, we’ve been hearing for several weeks that “Q has lost the room,” even from an immediate family member of a current player.
Is it true? It’s very hard to say. But somewhere between the front office, the coaching staff and the players, something has broken down—that much cannot be argued.
So what are the answers?
The internet and Hawk blogosphere is rife with trade suggestions—and/or blame assignment to Quenneville or Bowman or both.
And it all should be fair game. But we all need to enter a new stage of grief. As the shock of how bad this team has become as quickly as it has fades, and we move into acceptance, we need to also ask: what is the right next step?
The simmering debate surrounding the denouement of the Hawk “Dynasty” has been whether the Hawks would eventually do a drastic tear down and rebuild—or slowly become like the Red Wings have— holding on to a few storied veterans on a slow slide to mediocrity.
But the Hawks have become the Red Wings in a relative blink of an eye.
The party is, in fact, over. Yet, the streamers are still up, the expensive band is still playing, while the shrimp cocktail rots at empty tables and a couple of drunk guys fight it out in the driveway.
What to do with an underachieving, aging and a seemingly immoveable roster, a Hall of Fame coach who may have lost the room, and a GM who may not have any rabbits in his hat—nor the confidence of team ownership?
That, we discuss in Part 2.